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 The field of American Studies today faces a host of unprecedented challenges–and 
opportunities.  This is especially so for academic programs and departments situated outside the 
United States.  The current wave of anti-Americanism, spurred by the widespread unpopularity 
of the Iraq War and unease with the George W. Bush administration’s penchant for unilateral 
actions and its seeming disregard for the give-and-take of diplomacy, has politicized the study of 
American history and culture.  The growing difficulty of attaining visas for travel to and study 
in the United States ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, has compounded the 
problem.  Inevitably, American Studies programs in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and 
elsewhere have become lightning rods for criticism aimed at their central object of study.  
Significant opposition among scholars and citizen-activists to the phenomenon of globalization 
has added fuel to the fire, particularly since globalization is often seen as loosely synonymous 
with Americanization. 
 Yet these current trends also offer unique opportunities to American Studies scholars.  
The ongoing debates about globalization and its relationship to the United States, and to 
Americanization, demands the more informed judgments and perspectives that those immersed 
in American history, society, and culture can provide.  American Studies specialists who live 
and work outside the United States can play an especially valuable role in these debates since 
they are well positioned to assess the relative significance of the role exerted by American power, 
products, and culture within their own societies and regions.  Globalization thus offers, in many 




 Over the past decade and a half, globalization has become a ubiquitous buzzword–in 
public discourse, in governmental pronouncements, among economists and businessmen, and, 
not least, within various academic disciplines.  This has been the case not just in the United 
States but throughout the world–non-Western as well as Western.  It has, arguably, become the 
key term, concept, and theory being employed by those who seek to identify and comprehend 
what is most significant, and what is most historically distinctive, about the contemporary, post 
Cold War world.  That globalization’s ascendancy has transpired in so short a period of time, 
and without a consensus about how precisely either to define the term or to assess its impact, is 
nothing short of remarkable. 
 “‘Globalization’ is the buzzword of the late twentieth century,” observed journalist John 
Cassidy, in a New Yorker article in 1991, and “is set to become the biggest political issue of the 
next century.”1 “Globalization may not be a particularly attractive or elegant word,” proclaimed 
the British political philosopher Anthony Giddens, perhaps globalization’s foremost theorist, in 
1999.  “But absolutely no one who wants to understand our prospects at the century’s end can 
ignore it.”2 Plainly, it is being anything but ignored.  As Paul Kirkbridge, a British business 
professor, wrote recently: “If the shelves of airport bookstalls are any indications, the 1990s were 
the decade of globalization.  Whether in the fields of business, management, economics, 
information technology or e-commerce the word appears to be on everyone’s lips.”3 In 1997, the 
International Herald Tribune blared the headline: “Globalization Vaults into Reality”4 while the 
number of entries on globalization in the catalogue of the Library of Congress mushroomed from 
a mere 34 in 1994 to 693 in 1999.5 A recent check of the popular internet search engine 
“Google,” perhaps the most telling gauge, revealed that more than thirty million items or “hits” 
can be found within that basic category. 
 Within academe, globalization has proven the hottest of hot topics, encouraging a 
growing spate of scholars to frame their particular research projects within a globalist 
 2
rubric–whether such offers a comfortable fit or not.  The University of Florida, where I 
formerly taught, provides a telling microcosm of this tendency.  In the 2001-2002 academic 
year, its Religion and Political Science departments co-sponsored with the International Studies 
Program a series of high-profile lectures organized around the theme, “Religion and 
Globalization,” while the English Department hosted a conference on “America and 
Globalization.”  The former featured a stirring jeremiad by renowned University of California, 
Berkeley, sociologist Robert Bellah, which amounted to an updated New Left critique of 
American corporate capitalism as the sole author of globalization as well as the source of 
virtually all the world’s ills.  The latter included topics that testify unmistakably–even 
somewhat comically--to the amazing elasticity of the globalization framework.  It included 
papers with titles such as, “Family Values in the Post-Cold War era”; “Like an Asian Epidemic: 
Moving Between Bodies after HIV”; “Ambiguity of Borders: The Implications for American 
Citizenship”; and “American Intellectual Property and Global Yoga.”  The international 
relations scholar Justin Rosenberg has wryly observed about this trend:  “We live today in a 
veritable ‘age of globalization studies’, in which one academic discipline after another is gaily 
expanding its limit into the ‘global’ sphere and relocating its own subject matter in a 
geographically extended, worldwide perspective.”6 
 In the event, grand, ofttimes extravagant, claims have been made for the transcendent 
importance of globalization in human history.  “Just as postmodernism was the concept of the 
1980s,” asserts Australian sociologist Malcolm Waters, “globalization may be the concept, the 
key idea by which we understand the transition of human society into the third millennium.”7 
The editors of a much-cited collection on globalization label it today’s “central thematic for 
social theory.”8 Back in 1991, Anthony Giddens declared that “the emergence of globalized 
orders means that the world we live ‘in’ is different from that of previous ages.”9 “I would have 
no hesitation in saying,” he has written more recently, “that globalization as we are experiencing 
it, is in many respects not only new, but also revolutionary.”10 In a similar vein, Renato Ruggerio, 
the Italian Director General of the World Trade Organization, remarked in 1996 that 
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globalization was a reality “which overwhelms all others.”11 
 Thomas Friedman, the New York Times columnist and author of the best -selling books 
about globalization, The Lexus and the Olive Tree and The World is Flat has emerged as perhaps 
the most visible public proponent and interpreter, within the United States at least, of what he 
claims to be the dominant trend in the contemporary world.  “If you want to understand the 
post-Cold War world,” Friedman insists, “you have to start by understanding that a new 
international system has succeeded it–globalization.  That is ‘The One Big Thing’ people 
should focus on.  Globalization is not the only thing influencing events in the world today, but 
to the extent that there is a North Star and a worldwide shaping force, it is this system. . . . 
Globalization has replaced the Cold War as the defining international system.”12 
 But what, exactly, is globalization?  What, precisely, are all these observers referring to?  
The concept, it bears emphasizing, is a highly contested one about which little consensus exists.  
In fact, the sociologist Jan Aart Scholte, who has written one of the more thoughtful books about 
the phenomenon, says that “the only consensus about Globalization is that it is contested.  
People have held widely differing views regarding definition, scale, chronology, impact and 
policy.”13 Scholte insists–correctly, in my judgment–that globalization encompasses the cultural, 
the ecological, the economic, the historical, the legal, and the political; and yet he notes–also 
correctly, in my judgment–that many of those who write and talk about globalization focus on 
only a single one of those various interrelated aspects.  Key areas of dispute include, in addition 
to the definitional one, what is the driving force or forces behind globalization, the extent to 
which the recent process is with or without significant precedent, and the issue of whether it is a 
positive or a negative force. 
 With regard to the latter point, even those who may be unsure exactly what is meant by 
globalization are doubtlessly aware of the increasingly vocal anti-globalization movement, a 
movement that garnered world headlines during the disruption that followed recent international 
forums at Seattle, Genoa, Quebec City, and elsewhere.  In one, not atypical anti-globalization 
tract, a Canadian academic charges: “Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, corporate financial 
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interest and their mass media vehicles have together stormed governments with an overwhelming 
agenda for world corporate rule.”  Further, he declares that “on almost every indicator of social 
and ecological life. . . the restructuring of societies for corporate globalization has been 
increasingly life-destructive.”14 A book that has received perhaps more attention than any other 
academic work in recent years, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s, Empire, focuses centrally on 
globalization, a process that the authors equate with empire.  The New York Times has referred 
to their book as “a heady treatise on globalization that is sending frissons of excitement through 
campuses from Sao Paulo to Tokyo.”  Hardt and Negri argue that globalization is not simply 
the latest phase in the history of imperialism and the nation-state, but that it signifies something 
radically new: “a fluid, infinitely expanding and highly organized system that encompasses the 
world’s entire population.”  An “irresistible and irreversible globalization of economic and 
cultural exchanges” has occurred over the past several decades, they contend, that represents 
nothing less than “a new form of sovereignty.”15 
 Although there is no one agreed definition of globalization, the term is most commonly 
used to refer to a process of accelerating integration, especially in the economic and cultural 
realms.  Roland Robertson provided one of the earliest definitions, calling globalization “a 
concept [that] refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of 
consciousness of the world as a whole.”  In other words, it encompasses “both concrete global 
interdependence and consciousness of the global whole.”  Giddens has offered a similar 
definition.  “Globalization can,” he proposes, “be defined as the intensification of world-wide 
social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by 
events occurring many miles away and vice versa.”16 Malcolm Waters, building on both of those, 
calls globalization “a social process in which constraints of geography on economic, political, 
social and cultural arrangements recede, in which people become increasingly aware that they 
are receding and in which people act accordingly.”17 
 Others present more narrow, economically-based definitions.  The preeminent political 
scientist Robert Gilpin, for example, identifies globalization as “the increasing linkage of 
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national economies through trade, financial flows, and foreign direct investment (FDI) by foreign 
firms.”18 And historian Thomas Zeiler, focusing on the core economic mechanisms of 
globalization, defines it as “the organization of production, involving transnational networks that 
seek out cost and political advantages and that are financed by a virtually unregulated system of 
exchanges in money, credit, and equities.”19 Former president of the American Historical 
Association (AHA) Lynn Hunt, a historian of modern France, observed recently that the relative 
decline within the historical discipline of such once hotly debated theoretical perspectives as 
postmodernism, feminism, and Marxism has been paralleled by the ascendancy of globalization.  
Hunt defines globalization quite succinctly and reasonably as “worldwide integration through 
technology and market exchange.”20 
 As Hunt’s comments suggest, historians have hardly been immune to the globalization 
mania that has swept so many sister disciplines and that has proven so galvanizing in 
contemporary public discourse.  Some historians have, in fact, brought the tools of their 
discipline to bear in efforts aimed at historicizing the globalization process–at situating it within 
a longer continuum.  Thomas Zeiler, for example, used his 2001 Bernath Lecture to the Society 
for Historians of American Foreign Relations to do precisely this.  He emphasized that the 
period from the late nineteenth century up through World War I represented an era of incipient 
globalization with some important parallels to the contemporary era.21 A few months earlier, Eric 
Foner devoted his presidential address to the AHA to an examination of “American Freedom in a 
Global Age.”  Acknowledging that “the flow of people, investment, production, culture, and 
communications across national boundaries” was rapidly accelerating in our own age, and that 
many prominent social scientists were deeply engaged in efforts to explain and interpret this 
phenomenon, he offered a historians’s caveat about interpreting contemporary developments as a 
wholly new epoch in human history. 
 He is worth quoting at length.  “As a historian,” Foner emphasized, “I feel it necessary 
to point out that, like every other product of human activity, globalization itself has a history.  
The dream of global unity goes back to the days of Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan.  
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The internationalization of commerce and culture and the reshuffling of the world’s peoples have 
been going on for centuries.  Today’s globalized communications follow in the footsteps of 
clipper ships, the telegraph, and the telephone.  Today’s international movements for social 
change–including protests against some of the adverse consequences of globalization–have their 
precedents in transnational labor and socialist movements, religious revivals, and struggles 
against slavery and for women’s rights.  As for economic globalization, Karl Marx long ago 
pointed out that capitalism is an international system that “must nestle everywhere, settle 
everywhere, establish connections everywhere.”22 
 Walter LaFeber, in a suggestive 1999 book titled Michael Jordan and the New Global 
Capitalism, also joined the debate, provocatively exploring the nexus between technology, the 
media, the information revolution, and popular culture in our own age.  LaFeber argued that the 
enormously successful global marketing of sports over the past decade and a half stands as a 
microcosm of a much broader process, one that has led to the unprecedented worldwide 
dominance of U.S. capital and U.S. culture.  With the perspective and sensibility of a historian, 
he identified the antecedents of this development, calling it the latest wrinkle in the long history 
of imperialism, and specifically of the century-long U.S. drive to dominate international markets, 
while also stressing the much greater magnitude and impact of recent developments.  “A new 
era did not begin with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union between 
1989 and 1991,” LaFeber insists, “but with the information revolution, the new power of U.S. 
capital and transnational corporations to drive that revolution, and the reaction–sometimes 
violent–in the United States and abroad to the revolution.”  Whatever the era is termed, “it 
marks the beginning something different in world history.”23 
 Yet those and other important examples aside, it certainly remains the case that neither 
historians nor American Studies specialists have assumed a lead role in the examination of 
globalization.  In large part, one can assume, this stems from the scholarly training and 
inclinations that characterize the discipline of history and the interdisciplinary field of American 
Studies.  Hence, scholars in those areas have been much less likely to step forward boldly as 
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interpreters of the present than political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, economists, and 
other social scientists.  Instinctive caution and skepticism when faced with sweeping 
declarations about the onset of new epochs in human history also typifies both historians and 
American Studies scholars.  Many of the bedrock assumptions and assertions about the 
“newness” of globalization are rooted in what is presumed to be taking place right now, a time 
many globalization theorists take to be one of profound, revolutionary changes of an 
unprecedented nature.  As one puts it: “Contemporary patterns of global economic, military, 
technological, ecological, migratory, political and cultural flows are historically 
unprecedented.”24 Because this debate hinges to such a great extent on judgments about 
historical transformation, historians surely have much more to contribute than they have thus far.  
The fact that historians belong to a discipline that, by its very nature, tends toward the longer 
view regarding human affairs makes them particularly well positioned to mediate and temper 
some of the more breathlessly extravagant claims about the “uniqueness” of the present age and 
the relative absence of meaningful historical parallels. 
 Past AHA president Wm. Roger Louis, in his valedictory essay to the association, 
ruminated in 2002 about how the terrorist attacks of the previous year may come to be seen as a 
historical watershed. “The question of an era in history–what we call periodization–is one of the 
eternally fascinating problems we ponder in both teaching and writing,” Louis remarked.25 In 
that important sense historians are, in fact, much better suited than those in rival disciplines to 
assess whether long-term developments such as globalization and concrete events such as those 
surrounding the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 
2001, represent true historical watersheds.  To what extent do the events of September 11, and 
the broader wave of anti-American, anti-Western terrorism that they sprang from and formed a 
major part of, represent something sufficiently new and sufficiently distinctive to warrant 
attention for the sake of periodization?  Does either the “Age of Terror” or, perhaps more 
broadly, the ideological contest between Western, modernist values and those of radical Islam 
warrant recognition as marking a distinctive era?  Those questions cannot be disentangled from 
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the subject of the present essay on globalization.  Indeed, globalization, especially the 
international reaction against a globalization perceived by many as an effort to Westernize or 
Americanize the world, offers one interpretive framework within which we can begin to 
comprehend the events surrounding the Al Qaeda/jihadist  phenomenon. 
 Historians thus need to plunge more actively into the ongoing debates about globalization 
and its impact.  Diplomatic historians, cultural historians, social historians, historians of science 
and technology–all have an important role to play in the delineation of some of the distinctive 
and not-so-distinctive features of what so many now see as the dominant trend in today’s world.  
American Studies scholars, for their part, need to join these discussions as well.  In view of the 
central role, for better or worse, that the United States has played in these developments--as actor, 
as symbol, and as target–their voices are needed to lend perspective, nuance, and depth to often 
polemical debates. 
 The period from the late nineteenth century up to World War I forms an era of at least 
proto-globalization, as a number of scholars have pointed out.  Historians are well equipped to 
help trace the similarities and dissimilarities between that epoch and the one we now find 
ourselves in.  In terms of international migratory flows, for example, those years were actually 
more mobile than our own age: some 60 million Europeans moved to the United States, Australia, 
Latin America, and elsewhere during the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a time in 
which passports were unnecessary and immigration restrictions minimal.  International trade 
was, arguably, freer in the late nineteenth century as well, with substantially fewer trade barriers 
than exist in our supposedly open world.  Alan M. Taylor of Northwestern University recently 
remarked: “To me as an economic historian, it was the 19th century that represented the birth of 
the global economy.  These days, it’s just getting back to where it was 100 years ago.”26 In a 
similar vein, Charles W. Calomiris, a professor of finance and economics at Columbia University, 
notes: “We’re still not back to where we were 100 years ago.”27 Robert Gilpin has similarly 
observed that “despite the increasing attention given to economic globalization, the world in 
important ways is actually less integrated in the late twentieth century than it was in the late 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Recent integration of aspects of the world economy 
has been highly uneven, limited to particular economic sectors, and not nearly as global as many 
believe.”28 Pre-World War I globalization, according to Zeiler, “was greased by the 
technological leaps of transportation improvement like the steamship, and marvels like the Suez 
and Panama Canals, which sped European and American commerce around the globe.  
Transatlantic cables, then direct telegraph links to Latin America and connections through 
British cable to Asia, allowed American investors and merchants to communicate faster abroad, 
thus expanding their markets. . . . Global connections shrunk the world itself.”29 
 Like globalization, “Americanization,” too, has a history–or, perhaps more accurately, 
the fear of Americanization has a history.  It is certainly not a wholly new phenomenon, nor is 
the tendency to conflate a shrinking world with the dominance of American products and ideas.  
“Early in the twentieth century,” notes Zeiler, “some Europeans worried about the American 
‘invasion,’ and the ‘Americanization of the world’.”30 
 During the 1920s, popular culture–especially jazz and movies–became the most common 
manifestation of Americanization, and the principal foil of its critics.  Frank Costigliola has 
offered a pioneering analysis of this development in his book, Awkward Dominion.31 By 1925, 
American films made up 95% of the total shown in Britain, 70% in France, 65% in Italy, 60% in 
Germany, and 95% in Australia and New Zealand.  Trade tended to follow, with many 
consumers demanding the products pictured in American movies–much as occurs with the 
blatant “product placement” we see in films and television programs today.  “America has 
colonized us through the cinema, one Frenchman charged.  Another, a member of the French 
Chamber of Deputies, complained that Europeans had become “galley-slaves” to American 
finance and culture.  “The film is to America what the flag was once to Britain,” warned the 
London Morning Post.  By its means Uncle Sam may hope some day, if he be not checked in 
time, to Americanize the world.”32 
 A tumultuous decade-and-a-half of global depression and global conflict brought an 
abrupt halt to fears about the Americanization of the world.  But they returned with a vengeance 
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during the Cold War era, as American military, economic, and cultural power reached hitherto 
unimagined heights.  These renewed fears were often framed in terms of the need to resist 
American “cultural imperialism,” the so-called cocoa-colonization of the world.  A substantial, 
and rapidly growing, literature now exists on the enormously important and complex subject of 
America’s cultural impact on other peoples and societies during the second half of the self-styled 
“American century,.”  Yet the current debate about globalization-cum-Americanization 
curiously proceeds with barely a reference to this literature and ofttimes seems to overlook one 
of its central findings: namely, that cultural transmission is a more apt term than cultural 
imperialism.  “Cultural imperialism misconstrues Americanization in several ways,” observes 
cultural historian Richard Kuisel, author of the wonderfully titled Seducing the French: The 
Dilemma of Americanization.  “It emphasizes imposition and coercion; assumes audience 
passivity; postulates cultural coherence for both exporters and importers; and anticipates global 
homogeneity as the outcome.”33 
 
 Still, as exaggerated as the claims for the complete absence of historical precedents for 
today’s era of globalization may be, there are significant differences–in volume, scope, and 
intensity–between this and previous eras, and historians and American Studies scholars are 
particularly well positioned to identify and assess them.  As Zeiler notes, in the process of 
detailing the nascent globalization of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: “The 
sheer velocity of globalization today is staggering when compared to the earlier time.  So are 
the volume and scope. . . . The past two decades or so have witnessed a fundamental 
transformation in the global economy; the period before World War I was not globalized in the 
sense we use the term today.”34 To be more concrete: In 1900, daily foreign exchange trading 
was measured in the millions of dollars.  In 1992, it was $820 billion a day.  By 1998, it was 
up to $1.5 trillion a day.  Around 1900, private capital flows from developed to developing 
countries could be measure in the hundreds of millions of dollars, with relatively few countries 
involved.  By 2000, it was being measured in the hundreds of billions of dollars, with dozens of 
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countries involved.  As recently as 1975, foreign direct investment totaled only $23 billion.  
By 1997, it had swollen to $644 billion. 35 
 A case can be made that America’s cultural impact today is of a completely different 
magnitude as well.  This area of inquiry, though, poses much trickier and more complex 
standards for accurate measurement.  Friedman makes the case powerfully in his 
characteristically colorful language: “Today,” he write, “globalization often wears Mickey 
Mouse ears, eats Big Macs, drinks Coke or Pepsi and does its computing on an IBM PC, using 
Windows 98, with an Intel Pentium II processor and a network link from cisco Systems.”  He 
adds: “In most societies people cannot distinguish anymore among American power, American 
exports, American cultural assaults and plain vanilla globalization.  They are now all wrapped 
into one.”  Rising resentment of the United States, moreover, derives in large part for “a 
globalization system” that, in Friedman’s views, is “so heavily influenced today by American 
icons, markets, and military might.”36 
 The fact that nine out of ten of the world’s most recognized brand names are American is 
certainly a matter of no small significance.  It is also telling that McDonald’s franchises have 
become a symbolic target in Europe and the Middle East for local protests against the process of 
cultural homogenization throughout the world–even if ample evidence suggests that even that 
ubiquitous symbol of Americanization takes on very different cultural and social meanings in 
different societies.  Globalization is not Americanization, though the fact that the two are so 
frequently conflated stands as a critical subject that demands the most careful scrutiny and 
analysis by historians, social scientists, and American Studies specialists. 
 In conclusion, American Studies scholars should find in the concept of globalization an 
important point of entry into a range of broad intellectual debates about the nature of the 
contemporary world and its antecedents.  Those whose institutional affiliations and professional 
lives lie predominantly outside the United States can play an especially useful role.  Their 
expertise in American history, society, and culture, in conjunction with their knowledge of and 
insights into the societies in which they themselves reside and work, permits them to occupy a 
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mediatory, middle ground–and thus to traverse physical, intellectual, and metaphorical borders 
far more permeable to them than to most fellow scholars. 
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